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Technological progress makes possible, and economically fea-
sible, a variety of business innovations which can overcome the 
obstacles to intemational trade and investment imposed by most 
countries. These barriers take many forms, ranging from tariffs 
to quotas on trade to restrictions on foreign ownership of 
domestic business - but the global enterprise increasingly 
leams how to overcome them, albeit at a price. 
Responding to Trade Barriers 
For a variety of political reasons - mainly to "protect" home 
industry owners, managers, and employees, but sometimes on 
ostensibly national security grounds - govemments often erect 
barriers to intemational commerce. The most notable are tariffs, 
quotas, domestic content restrictions, and reciprocity rules. In a 
1991 survey, 45 percent of U.S. frrms reported that trade barriers 
imposed by other countries presented the greatest impediment to 
selling abroad. I 
Exporters can absorb the added costs imposed by govem-
ments - at least to some extent. In the case of quotas imposed 
by the importing nations, companies frequently shift to higher-
priced items on which unit profits are also greater. This was the 
response of Korean and Taiwanese shoe producers in the late 
1970s to numerical limits on the imports into the United States 
of shoes from those two countries.2 
In the early 1980s, American purchasers of Japanese-made 
automobiles often found that they were required to buy all sorts 
of high-priced extras and that they were paying as much as 
$2,000 above the sticker price for the reduced supply of Toyotas, 
Nissans, and other Japanese automobiles. In that way, the 
Japanese producers actually benefitted from the "voluntary" re-
strictions on their exports to the United States. They increased 
their profits substantially in the face of quantitative limits on 
their exports of cars to the United States. While the Japanese 
producers exported about 30 percent of their auto production to 
the United States during that period, they eamed approximately 
one-half of their profits from sales in the United States.s 
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When faced with more onerous obstacles to international 
trade, businesses draw on a variety of alternatives to direct ex-
porting. They set up new manufacturing facilities (so-called 
greenfield operations) in the host nation. John Deere was one of 
many companies to establish production facilities in Europe in 
the 1950s in order to avoid the 18 percent tariff enacted follow-
ing the formation of the European Common Market. 4 
This type of response continues today. In 1991, Monsanto's 
low-calorie sweetener NutraSweet was hit with a very high duty 
in response to a charge of dumping in the European Community 
(EC). In 1992, the company entered into a joint venture with 
Ajinomoto, a Japanese food and pharmaceutical company, to 
build a plant in France to produce for the European market. One 
senior NutraSweet official described the situation very directly: 
Although there may be evidence to the contrary, 
our experience only tells me that you have to be in 
Europe if you want to do business in Europe ... 
You can't sit offshore somewhere and ship your 
product in.5 
Many Japanese manufacturers moved the production of such 
products as textiles, watches, televisions, cameras and calcula-
tors to facilities in Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore, and 
the Philippines in response to the restrictive trade practices of 
some of their major markets. 6 Japanese automakers are also 
producing automobiles in the United States on a large scale. 
This approach provides the Japanese fliiils direct access to the 
markets of the local economies in which they produce and min-
imizes their exposure to adverse policies by the host govern-
ment. It also permits the Japanese companies to export to mar-
kets in other nations that maintain barriers against products 
made in their home territory. For instance, Honda sells cars to 
Taiwan, South Korea, and Israel from its manufacturing plant in 
Ohio. Those three countries have traditionally prohibited the 
importation of automobiles directly from Japan. 7 
Similarly, Northern Telecom, a Canadian telecommunications 
company, conducts business with Japan through its U.S. sub-
sidiaries, since Japanese fliiils are considered to favor U.S. over 
Canadian telecommunications companies. This point was made 
directly by a Northern Telecom official, "The reality is that we 
probably could not have penetrated Japan out of Canada. "8 
Firms also respond by acquiring existing local companies. 
This has been a particularly important strategy for foreign busi-
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nesses positioning themselves in response to the integration of 
the European market. Many American and Japanese companies 
fear that the removal of internal regulatory and economic barri-
ers in Europe will result in an increase in reciprocity require-
ments and local content restrictions. Thus, acquisitions in-
creased steadily during the mid- to late-1980s as fliiils sought to 
gain a foothold there.9 
Examples in 1990 include Emerson Electric's purchase of the 
French fliiil Leroy-Somer, General Electric's acquisition of the 
United Kingdom's Burton Group Financial Services, American 
Brands' buyout of Scotland's Whyte & Mackay Distillers Ltd., 
and Scott Paper's purchase ofTungram Company ofGermany.1o 
Other alternatives that business fliiils frequently rely upon to 
develop positions in the markets of other nations include sub-
contracting production, purchasing locally, and developing 
products jointly with local fliiils. 
To overcome political objections to goods produced by work-
ers in other countries, some multinational corporations set up so-
called "screwdriver" operations - assembly plants using key 
components manufactured in the home country and performing 
no R&D locally. Thus, the economic contribution in the host 
country is minimized. Japanese companies are especially guilty 
of using this technique. One analyst has used the term 
"rainbow" to describe this tendency of large Japanese fliiils, 
"The U.S. plant is situated here, the mother plant is situated 
over in Japan and nothing touches in between ... and the pot of 
gold is at the other end." 11 
In a more overt move to reduce opposition to foreign fliiils 
"taking away American jobs," Toyota announced in mid-1992 its 
plans to start buying parts from a U.S. competitor, Chrysler. 
Toyota will buy charcoal-containing canisters (used in emission-
control systems) for its Georgetown, Kentucky, factory which 
produces the Camry. It also expects to export some of the canis-
ters to Japan to use in its cars made there. In a less publicized 
manner, Chrysler has been producing parts for Mitsubishi for 
many years. Ford and General Motors are also among Toyota's 
North American suppliers.12 
Although the principal explanation for onshore production by 
Japanese producers is as a response to U.S. protectionism, many 
U.S. observers believe that such investments are also a hedge 
against even more stringent measures and may even head them 
off.1S 
Moreover, joint ventures, particularly those involving the op-
eration of manufacturing facilities, are often necessary to over-
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come trade restrictions, especially in the case of the formation of 
protectionist trade blocs. This trend is evident in the aerospace 
and automobile industries, where every major company has 
formed alliances with foreign competitors. For instance, Ford 
Motor Company has formed a joint venture with a local producer 
in Taiwan to assemble Festivas for sale in that market. An al-
liance involving Ford, Mazda, and Matsushita Electric of Japan 
manufactures air-conditioners for Fords and Mazdas sold in 
Japan. General Motors markets some of its automobiles in 
Japan through a three-way joint venture involving Suzuki and 
Nissho Iwai Corporation.l4 
Yet, while joint ventures and other cooperative strategies are 
often considered as "second-best" relative to exporting or the op-
eration of a wholly owned facility, they do provide important 
benefits. These include, in addition to market entry, the advan-
tage of working with a partner knowledgeable about the local 
market. as well as the sharing of production costs and risks. 
In some circumstances, firms may be able to export duty-free 
to countries possessing broad tariff policies in exchange for capi-
tal investments or for using local contractors or raw materials in 
the production process.l5 A joint venture between General 
Motors and a state-owned automobile maker in Poland to manu-
facture cars domestically will provide a significant inflow of capi-
tal, technology, and expertise to the beleaguered Polish car-
maker. In return, General Motors will be allowed to import into 
Poland a portion of its automobiles duty-free.l6 
Responding to Investment Barriers 
On other occasions, fum.s face sharp limits to foreign owner-
ship of local enterprises. This type of governmentally imposed 
barrier has become more popular in a period when formal trade 
barriers have been reduced substantially. Investment barriers 
may include formal restrictions on investment, or less formal but 
often equally powerful tax and regulatory advantages limited to 
local companies. 
Even though mergers and acquisitions are the dominant 
modes of penetrating European markets, there exists consider-
able opposition to American takeovers of very large local fum.s, 
especially among the member countries of the European 
Community. To date, there have been few acquisitions by U.S. 
companies in Europe that amounted to over $1 billion.17 
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In Indonesia, no foreign company can buy a local fum. or set 
up a new one (except in a very few designated areas). As are-
sult, as elsewhere in the Asian rim, international enterprises 
most often enter into joint ventures with local fum.s or, in ex-
treme cases, literally give away nominal majority ownership. 
For these reasons, in Asia and in Eastern Europe, joint ventures 
and other strategic alliances are the dominant modes used by 
foreign companies attempting to develop a presence in local 
markets (see Figure 1). This is particularly true in the case of 
high-technology industries (see Appendix). 
There exists considerable opposition to 
American takeovers of very large local firms, 
especially among the member countries 
of the European Community. 
In the case of defense production, many of the cross-border al-
liances may at their heart be involuntary on the part of the for-
eign partner. In large measure, producers of advanced weapon 
systems enter into agreements with foreign fum.s in order to gain 
(or avoid losing) governmental customers. During the 1970s and 
1980s, European governments demanded a greater role in the 
development of the military aircraft they were buying from the 
United States. A counterpart was the Japanese desire to build 
up its aircraft manufacturing industry as exemplified in the con-
troversial FSX fighter aircraft project involving a joint venture 
between a Japanese manufacturer and a major U.S. aerospace 
fum.. 
These demands for production (and often technology) sharing 
intensified at a time when the United States government was ea-
ger to reduce the development costs of its weapon systems and 
wished to encourage standardization, especially in NATO 
weapons. In 1986, Congress reinforced this trend by enacting 
legislation that encouraged multinational cooperation in 
weapons development. 
Another strategy adopted by foreign governments has been to 
demand a greater role in the production of aircraft they were 
purchasing from American companies. Faced with the prospect 
that several European governments might try to develop an in-
digenous military fighter to rival the F -16, the General Dynamics 
Corporation agreed to assign a major production role to domestic 
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Figure 1 
Variations in U.S. Business Responses 
to Global Markets in 1990 
European Community 
New Facilities (22%) 
Asia 
New Facilities {25%) 
Acquisitions (28%) 
Joint Ventures (47%) 
Source: See Appendix, compiled from unpublished data made 
available by the Conference Board, New York City. 
frrms in prospective purchaser nations. This role included pro-
duction of parts for aircraft sold to the U.S. Air Force. Aided by 
such arrangements, and with the backing of leading Belgian and 
Dutch aircraft frrms, General Dynamics won the contract over 
strong competition. IS 
In some circumstances, a host government may be willing to 
accept the construction, expansion, or acquisition of a local 
branch by an American company on the condition that the firm 
meets a specified performance requirement or provides another 
concession. Before IBM was allowed to increase its operations in 
Mexico, the company agreed to set up a development center for 
semiconductors, to purchase high-technology components from 
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Mexican companies, and to produce software for Latin America 
in Mexico.l9 
In the case of more standard manufactured goods, other ways 
around investment barriers include entering into agreements 
with local frrms who will produce the item under licensing ar-
rangements. In some instances, frrms that would prefer to ex-
port products manufactured in their home countries are forced to 
agree to license the manufacture to a company in the host coun-
try. While Japanese civilian markets are becoming more open to 
foreign investment (IBM and Texas Instruments own production 
facilities there), many companies must still rely on licensing and 
other cooperative contractual relationships between the parent 
and Japanese frrms. For example, U.S. companies, such as 
Honeywell, RCA, and General Electric, have often been limited to 
engaging in licensing arrangements in Japan.2o 
Moreover, Japanese frrms have produced, under licensing 
from American frrms, the McDonnell Douglas F-15 fighter air-
craft, the Boeing Chinook helicopter, and the Lockheed P-3C air-
craft. Similarly, companies in Taiwan have been licensed to 
manufacture the M-109 howitzer, the FFG-7 class frigates, and 
several missiles.21 At other times, a production-sharing ar-
rangement is required. For example, a government-owned air-
line may require the manufacturer to buy designated amounts of 
locally produced parts. 
In the case of services, franchising to a domestic enterprise 
serves a similar purpose to licensing in adjusting to barriers to 
direct investment. However, governments may insist that the 
domestic operator be given a majority control over the franchise 
operations. For instance, South Korea generally discourages 
franchising unless the local partner is given at least 50 percent 
ownership. In addition, profits from the franchising business are 
taxed at 40 percent, and a 10.75 percent withholding tax is 
levied on royalties and dividends earned by the parent organiza-
tion. Taiwan maintains similar restrictions but seldom allows 
franchising agreements to extend beyond five years. Taiwan 
also taxes dividends and royalties at 35 and 20 percent respec-
tively.22 
Responding to Other Governmental Barriers 
In other parts of the world, especially in the less developed 
nations, public-sector deterrents to business take different forms. 
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Governments on occasion restrict repatriation of earnings, or 
foreign businesses fear future expropriation of their assets. 
Governments may also restrict location, lmancing, and technol-
ogy inputs, and require local sourcing of raw materials and rigid 
technical specifications.2S 
Uncertainty as to future public-sector policies 
constitutes a major obstacle to investments 
by foreign firms. 
Indirect barriers, such as inadequate patent protection laws, 
may also impede a firm's ability to market its products success-
fully in a foreign country. Marsh-McBirney reports that the 
company has been especially hurt by the weakness of patent 
protection overseas. In particular, company officials believe that 
its export business in Europe would double if its patented prod-
ucts were adequately protected there.24 In such circumstances, 
uncertainty as to future public-sector policies constitutes a major 
obstacle to investments by foreign frrms. 
At times, policy shifts occur in the host country. For exam-
ple, until1985, Japanese electronics fums generally had been re-
luctant to make equity investments in China. Japanese exports 
had met considerable success, assisted by concessionary lmanc-
ing provided by their government. Beijing's tightened control 
over foreign exchange in 1986, however, resulted in a basic 
change in the way in which the Japanese companies penetrated 
the Chinese electronics market. The giants of the industry -
Matsushita, Hitachi, Sony, NEC, and Sanyo -all sharply in-
creased their direct investments and joint ventures in the PRC.25 
Global enterprises interested in doing business in parts of the 
world characterized by great business uncertainty often set up 
affiliate or correspondent relationships with local fums. This 
minimizes risk and liability - and also profit potentials. 
Consider the case of Exxon, whose Venezuela operations were 
nationalized in 1975. Responding to a new political environ-
ment in that South American nation, the company has reopened 
an office in Caracas to pursue proposals to build and operate en-
ergy facilities -with local partners under joint-venture agree-
ments. 
A combination of much lower wage rates and far less burden-
some regulation has encouraged many Hong Kong companies to 
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relocate to Guangdong and other adjacent parts of mainland 
China. Hong Kong has begun to enforce several tough anti-pol-
lution laws; excessive industrial discharges into the air or the 
harbor are punishable by substantial fines. The prospect of uni-
fication of Hong Kong and mainland China is, of course, another 
important but immeasurable factor. 
As a result, companies based in Hong Kong have invested ap-
proximately ten billion dollars in China and now reportedly con-
trol two-thirds of the twenty thousand factories that have been 
built since 1980 in the adjacent area on the mainland. The 
movement to the China mainland is very substantial. A decade 
ago, Hong Kong had 3,200 toy factories. Almost all of such 
manufacturing now takes place across the border.26 
When other barriers have been imposed by governments in 
the more advanced economies, licensing arrangements can be 
made with domestic firms in exchange for market entry. These 
governmental obstacles include local political or industrial pres-
sures, local distribution systems strongly favoring home-pro-
duced products, and heavy transportation costs. Enterprises in 
advanced economies can thus respond to attractive overseas 
markets without directly penetrating them. Some U.S. work-
station manufacturers have established licensing partnerships 
with Japanese frrms desiring to enter the worldwide workstation 
market in return for access to the lucrative Japanese portion of 
the important computer market. 
Companies that have difficulty introducing products in the 
home country due to delayed approval or stricter governmental 
requirements can license their products to lrrms in other coun-
tries in an effort to introduce them to markets more quickly. 
This practice is common to some U.S. pharmaceutical frrms. For 
example, Vestar and Genentech have on occasion introduced 
drugs in Europe before they were approved in the United 
States.27 
A more fundamental response to burdensome domestic regu-
lation is occurring in the U.S. petroleum industry. National pol-
icy keeps drilling rigs out of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, 
which the industry considers to be the country's best prospect 
for new oil exploration. A recently enacted energy bill also ex-
tends moratoriums on offshore drilling and the new clean-air 
rules make it more expensive and difficult to relme oil in the 
United States. 
As a result, U.S.-based energy companies have been expand-
ing their overseas operations while cutting back their domestic 
activities. The number of drilling rigs searching for oil and gas 
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in the United States has declined from 4,530 at the end of 1981 
to 596 in mid-1992. Total outlays for exploration and 
development in the United States by 30 large oil and gas 
companies fell 4 percent in 1991. Their investment abroad 
increased by 27 percent and totaled more than 50 percent higher 
than in domestic markets. 
Faced with rising government burdens in one nation, 
a firm can shift its high value-added activities 
to other nations with lower taxes and 
less burdensome regulation. 
As recently as 1987, the domestic investment outlays of the 
major U.S. energy companies exceeded their foreign expendi-
tures. Thus, a major American industry is responding quietly 
but effectively to onerous domestic regulation by putting its 
growth overseas.28 
In many other instances - especially in the more developed 
nations - companies face high business taxes and onerous regu-
latory costs. In some cases, the barriers may be rather informal 
in nature. When these barriers to business occur in the home 
country, the enterprise can expand overseas. In more extreme 
cases, existing business operations are moved to a more favor-
able policy environment in another country. In the case of in-
formal barriers, such as in nations whose traditions favor estab-
lished companies over newcomers, the response by the 
transnational company often is to market through local 
distributors. 
It is helpful under changing political circumstances to do 
business in several countries. In that event, when faced with ris-
ing government burdens in one nation, a frrm can shift its high 
value-added activities to other nations in which it operates, 
specifically those with lower taxes and less burdensome regula-
tion. 
Export restraints are usually imposed by governments at-
tempting to punish another country by applying sanctions 
against its trade. Compensating shifts often occur in the geo-
graphic distribution of goods from various exporting and import-
ing nations. Companies in the target nation may supply or be 
supplied by frrms in other nations, which are not adhering to the 
sanctions; frrms in the sanctioning nation may wind up selling to 
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or buying from frrms that are the former customers of the non-
sanctioning countries. 
For example, during the 1980 U.S. grain embargo against the 
Soviet Union, companies in Canada, Australia, Argentina, and 
the European Community increased their wheat sales to the 
Soviets. Companies in the United States in turn shifted wheat to 
customers of these countries. Thus, the main impact of the em-
bargo was to shift the international distribution of wheat sales, 
with little effect on their total amount.29 
It should be emphasized, however, that traditional business 
reasons are also involved in the choice among the available 
methods of penetrating foreign markets. Indeed, those business 
concerns - such as cost and transportation advantages - may 
often be the dominating influence. 
The Feedback on Government Policy 
In the years ahead, the combined power of economic incen-
tives and technological change will increasingly have feedback 
effects on the decisions of voters and government officials as 
they develop new national (and regional) policies dealing with 
the global economy. In a basic sense, the mobility of enterprises 
- of their people, capital, and information - is reducing the 
power of government. Public-sector decision makers increas-
ingly are being forced to understand that they no"?' have to be-
come internationally competitive in the economic policies they 
devise. Governmental activities that impose costs without com-
pensating benefits or that reduce wealth substantially in the pro-
cess of redistributing income undermine the competitive posi-
tions of domestic enterprises. The result is either the loss of 
business to frrms located in other nations or the movement of 
the domestic company's resources and operations to more hos-
pitable locations. 
Political scientists and economists have long understood that 
people vote with their feet. They leave localities, regions, and 
nations with limited opportunity in favor of those that offer a 
more attractive future. In this era of computers, telephones, and 
fax machines, enterprises are far more mobile than that; infor-
mation - that key resource - can be transferred in a matter of 
seconds, or less. The fear of losing economic activity to other 
parts of the world can be expected to reshape future domestic po-
litical agendas in fundamental ways. 
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Of course, not all governmental involvement in international 
business is of a negative nature. On many occasions, public-sec-
tor policies actively encourage foreign companies to invest, to 
build new facilities or otherwise to participate in the local econ-
omy. Such supportive actions include tax abatements, tariff 
waivers, liberal credit terms, and reductions in burdensome reg-
ulation. For instance, as an incentive to invest in Hungary, the 
Hungarian government offered Ford Motor Company a 10-year 
freeze on the payment of taxes.80 
In a global economy, governmental barriers 
become far from absolute. 
Moreover - and often of transcending importance -business 
enterprises simultaneously take into account a great variety of 
traditional business considerations. These range from differ-
ences in production and distribution costs to the limits of the 
firms' own fmancial and organizational capabilities. In the move 
toward globalization, individual firms may experience rough 
sledding and reverse some of their foreign commitments. 
The alliance between General Motors and Daewoo of South 
Korea went sour when Daewoo's desire to expand in local mar-
kets conflicted with GM's global objectives.81 Greater difficulties 
have arisen in the transitional economies of Eastern Europe and 
the republics of the former Soviet Union. Often investors do not 
know if they have legal title to the items they purchase. As a re-
sult, of the 2,000 deals Americans have made in Russia and the 
other republics, less than 100 are functioning. 
In late 1981, Metallgesellschaft AG, the large German metal-
lurgy fli'IIl, pulled out of its 60 percent stake in a steel plant in 
Hungary. The German company said that the Hungarian gov-
ernment partners wanted it to foot a larger portion of the operat-
ing costs than its contract provided for. According to Peter 
Giesler, an official of Metallgesellschaft, "We learned that con-
tracts which were made at the time were not enforceable at an-
other time." 
The American fli'IIl United Technologies reports a similar ex-
perience. In 1991, it signed a contract to sell jet engines to 
Malev, the Hungarian national airline. The document contained 
a clause stating that it was legally binding. However, Malev 
called it merely a "letter of intent" and subsequently announced 
that it would purchase the engines from General Electric. 
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Although the American fli'IIl won when it sued in a Hungarian 
court, the case is now on appeal. 82 
In more developed markets, DuPont and Holland's Philips 
ended a cooperative agreement because of different goals. So did 
Borden, Inc. and Japan's Meiji Milk Products. Earlier, Bull of 
France, Siemens of Germany, and Philips abandoned their at-
tempt to form a Europe-based computer alliance. 88 Clearly, the 
interaction of regionalization and globalization will continue to 
generate winners and losers. 
Even if many of the public-sector barriers remain, the private-
sector will increasingly learn how to overcome them or even just 
to live with them. Of course, there are costs involved when 
businesses respond to governmental barriers to international 
business. However, in a global economy, these barriers become 
far from absolute. 
Conclusion 
The tension between business and government is nothing 
new. It has traditionally existed between large private enter-
prises and the rulers of developing countries (see Table 1). This 
tension between governments generally (both those with devel-
oping and those with more advanced economies) and the busi-
ness fliTil is being exacerbated by the rapid rate of economic, so-
cial, and technological change. 
Companies oriented to the global marketplace, in turn, have a 
variety of response mechanisms to draw upon. These range 
from exporting to acquiring other fli'IIls to licensing products and 
services, and to entering into strategic alliances with other busi-
ness fliTils. As we have seen, those choices are often strongly in-
fluenced by governmental policies and practices. These public-
sector influences include actions by the nation in which the par-
ent company is located as well as by the country in which the 
fliTil is trying to develop a new presence. The governmental ac-
tions range from the supportive, such as a tax incentive to invest 
in a specific region, to overt barriers, notably restrictions on im-
ports and foreign investment. 
Fortunately, there is another force involved that ultimately is 
likely to carry the day- the citizen as consumer. Consumers 
vote every day of the week - in dollars, yen, Deutsche marks, 
pounds, francs, and lira. The same protectionist-oriented voters, 
as consumers, purchase products made everywhere in the world. 
They give far greater weight in spending their own money to 
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Table 1 
Tensions Between Developing-Country Goals 
and Business Activities 
Developing Countries 
Promote local ownership 
Increase local control 
Change payment 
characteristics and reduce 
duration of contracts 
Minimize source firm's control 
over use of technology and 
capital in user nation 
Separate technology from 
normal private investments 
Remove restrictive business 
clauses in investment and 
technology agreements 
Minimize proprietary rights of 
suppliers 
Reduce contract security 
Encourage transfer of R&D to 
host country 
Develop products suitable for 
domestic markets 
International Private Enterprises 
Maintain global standards and 
efficiency 
Minimize cost and complexity of 
delivering technology and capital 
Receive just returns for risks 
Gain assurance regarding property 
rights over use of private resources 
Provide technology as part of long-
term production and market 
development 
Maintain ability to affect the use of 
capital, technology and associated 
products 
Protect right to profit from private 
investments 
Use contracts to create an 
environment of stability and trust 
Maintain control of R&D paid for by 
company 
Gain global economies of scale to 
lower cost of products to consumers 
Source: Adapted from the President's Task Force on International Private 
Enterprise, The Prl.vate Enterprf.se Guldebook (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1984). 
14 
price and quality than country of origin. And they increasingly 
travel to, and communicate with, people in virtually every land. 
Consequently, businesses will continue to adopt innovative and 
effective responses not only to the barriers governments may 
erect, but also to the potential to turn a profit in a global 
economy. 
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Appendix 
U.S. Business Investment Overseas, 1988-1990 
This appendix contains detailed data on direct investments by 
U.S. manufacturing companies in overseas markets during the 
period 1988-1990, as provided by the Conference Board.l The 
tables which follow indicate the specific types of investments by 
U.S. manufacturers. The Conference Board collected the data 
from business publications and announcements of planned U.S. 
manufacturing operations abroad. The data is limited to firms 
with combined domestic and foreign sales of $1 million or more 
annually; thus, the tables cover medium-to-large-size companies. 
The types of manufacturing operations recorded include joint 
ventures with and acquisitions of foreign companies, as well as 
expansions of existing production facilities or construction of 
new plants. Also included is information regarding the country 
in which the investment is made, the amount, in dollars, of the 
overseas investment, and the type of product that will be manu-
factured. The data set was supplemented with information re-
garding the size of the U.S. parent firm and the specific industry 
in which the manufacturing operations will take place. 
Table A.1 presents a breakdown of investment by type of in-
dustry, following the two-digit SIC (Standard Industrial 
Classification) codes. Chemicals (SIC 28) and electronic and 
electrical equipment and components (SIC 36 and 38) represent 
the most important industries in terms of the number of over-
seas operations in which U.S. fums engaged during the years 
1988-1990. 
Overall, acquisitions appear to be the preferred method of 
conducting manufacturing operations abroad, accounting for 
more than half of the total. However, this pattern does not hold 
up over all geographic areas. As suggested by Table A.2, acqui-
sitions are usually used in the European Community and in 
Canada. Joint ventures, on the other hand, are most important 
in Asia. As demonstrated in the body of this paper, this is likely 
due to the fact that investment restrictions by Asian rim nations 
make joint ventures and other strategic alliances the most feasi-
ble method of operating in those countries. 
lFor more detail, see Harvey S. James, Jr., Patterns of 
Economic Globalization: The Case of U.S. Manufacturers, 
1988-1990 (St. Louis: Washington University, Center for the 
Study of American Business, forthcoming). 
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Tables A.3, A.4, and A.5 give details on the number of fmns 
for the entire sample, the European Community and Asia that 
utilize acquisitions, joint ventures, and new plants or expansions 
abroad, respectively, for all manufacturing industries. 
Figures A.1, A.2, and A.3 indicate the influence of technology 
on activities of manufacturing enterprises. High-technology in-
dustries are those in which R&D represent a significant percent-
age of total sales. In the figures presented here, high-technology 
industries are coded from the following two-digit SIC areas: 28 
chemicals, 35 machinery and computers, 36 electronic equip-
ment and components, 37 transportation equipment, and 38 an-
alytical instruments. While joint ventures continue to be the 
dominant way in which U.S. manufacturers operate in Asia, they 
are relatively less important in the case of low-technology prod-
ucts. Similarly, while acquisitions are the main way that 
American manufacturing firms establish an operating presence 
in Western Europe, joint ventures are relied on most heavily in 
the case of high technology companies. 
In Tables A.6 and A.7, the size of the U.S. fliiil is presented 
relative to the geographic area in which the company invests 
abroad and the type of investment activity the fum engages in. 
The size of companies is determined by annual domestic and 
foreign sales in 1991, and is 'taken from the Lotus Development 
Corporation CD/ROM data base.2 The average flTIIl had com-
bined domestic and foreign sales of $13.9 billion. The sales of 
firms ranged from a low of $1 million to a high of $119.8 billion. 
The size of flTIIls for the tables and figures presented here is 
coded as follows: small firms are companies with annual sales of 
less than $100 million; medium-size fums have sales between 
$100 million and $1 billion; mediurnllarge companies have an-
nual sales of $1-10 billion; large companies have sales of $10-50 
billion; companies with sales exceeding $50 billion are coded as 
very large. 
Figures A.4 and A.5 depict the pattern of investment activities 
in Asia and the European Community by the size of the firm. 
The differences in scale facilitate comparison between Asia and 
Europe. 
2Lotus One Source, Release 3.1, CD/Corporate: U.S. Public 
Companies (Cambridge, MA: Lotus Development Corp., 1991). 
Annual sales of companies not listed in the CD data base sample 
were obtained from Million Dollar Directory: America's Leading 
Public and Private Companies (Parsippany, NJ: Dun & Bradstreet, 
1992.) Firms with no sales data available were excluded. 
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Table A.l 
Number of U.S. Manufacturing Investment 
Activities Abroad, by Industry, 
1988-1990 
Tvoe of Investment 
Industry 
Chemicals 
Electric/ 
electronic equip. 
Machinery 
Transportation 
equip. 
Petroleum 
Metals 
Wood/paper 
products 
Food products 
Textiles 
Other 
manufacturing 
Total 
Acqui-
sitions 
52 
55 
53 
23 
4 
21 
33 
54 
8 
M 
354 
Joint 
Ven-
tures 
37 
43 
22 
25 
5 
13 
9 
12 
4 
25 
195 
New 
plants/ 
Expan-
sions Total 
37 126 
22 120 
11 86 
7 55 
1 10 
9 43 
9 51 
8 74 
2 14 
..ll ..89 
119 668 
Source: Compiled from unpublished worksheets supplied 
by the Conference Board. 
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Table A.2 
Number of U.S. Manufacturing Investment 
Activities, by Area, 1988-1990 
Type of Investment 
New 
Joint plants/ 
Acqui- Ven- Expan-
Target Area sitions tures sions Total 
European Community 221 63 67 351 
Asia 31 76 30 137 
Canada 65 5 9 79 
Latin America 10 14 10 34 
Other Europe 27 37 _a 67 
Total 354 195 119 668 
Source: Same as Table A.l. 
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Table A.3 Table A.4 
Number of U.S. Firms Making Acquisitions, Number of U.S. Firms Engaged in Joint Ventures, 
by Industry, 1988-1990 by Industry, 1988-1990 
European Latin European Latin 
Industry ~Qmmunitt Asia America Industry ~Qmmunitt Asia Am~ri~a 
Chemicals 27 3 2 Chemicals 14 13 3 
Electric/ electronic 36 5 2 Electric/ electronic 14 20 3 
equipment equipment 
Machinery 37 4 0 Machinery 9 10 0 
Transportation 17 3 1 Transportation 8 9 2 
equipment equipment 
Petroleum 2 1 0 Petroleum 1 2 0 
Metals 14 0 0 Metals 4 4 2 
Wood/paper 21 2 1 Wood/paper 4 0 0 
products products 
Food 31 4 4 Food products 3 6 0 
Textiles 6 2 0 Textiles 1 1 1 
Other ~ z Q Other 
manufacturing _Q il _a 
Total 221 31 10 
Total 63 76 14 
Source: Same as Table A.1. 
Source: Same as Table A.1 
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Table A.S 
Number of Firms Building New Plants 
or Expanding Existing Facilities, 
by Industry, 1988-1990 
European Latin 
~Qmmuni~ ~ Ameri!;il 
Chemicals 21 9 3 
Electric/ electronic 13 7 2 
equipment 
Machinery 8 1 2 
Transportation 7 0 0 
equipment 
Petroleum 1 0 0 
Metals 5 1 0 
Wood/paper 2 3 1 
products 
Food products 3 3 0 
Textiles 2 0 0 
Other 
manufacturing .Q _§ ..2 
Total 67 30 10 
Source: Same as Table A.1 
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Table A.6 
U.S. Manufacturing Investment Abroad, 
by Size of Firm, Geographic Area, 1988-1990 
European Latin All 
Community Asia America Others 
Size No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Small 17 40.5 5 11.9 3 7.1 17 40.5 
Medium 63 54.3 18 15.5 5 4.3 30 25.9 
Medium/Large 162 54.6 55 18.5 15 5.1 65 21.9 
Large 70 49.7 43 30.5 6 4.3 22 15.6 
Very Large M 55.4 ..ll 23.1 _Q. 8.9 .:z 12.5 
Total 343 52.6 134 20.6 34 5.2 141 21.6 
Source: Same as Table A.1 
Table A.7 
Types of U.S. Manufacturing Investment Abroad, 
by Size of Firm and Type of Investment, 1988-1990 
Joint New plants/ 
Acquisitions Ventures Expansions 
Size No. % No. % No. % 
Small 2.2 52..4 15 35.7 5 11.9 
Medium 77 66.4 27 23.3 12 10.3 
Medium/Large 172 57.9 75 25.3 50 16.8 
Large 55 39.0 53 37.6 33 23.4 
Very Large ...lQ 2.6.8 24 42.9 l1 30.4 
Total 341 52..3 194 29.8 117 17.9 
Source: Same as Table A.1 
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Figure A.l 
Proportion of U.S. Manufacturing Investment 
Abroad in Acquisitions, by Area, 1988-1990 
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Figure A.2 
Proportion of U.S. Investment in Joint Ventures, 
by Area, 1988-1990 
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Both figures same as Table A.l. 
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Figure A.3 
Proportion of U.S. Investment in New/Expanded 
Facilities, by Area, 1988-1990 
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Figure A.4 
U.S. Manufacturing Investment in the 
European Community, by Size of Firm, 1988-1990 
~1 
E 
::J 
z 
Source: 
Small Medium Med/Large Large Very Large 
Size of the U.S. Parent Company 
D Acquisitions - Joint Ventures ~ New/Expansions 
Both figures same as Table A.l. 
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Figure A.S 
U.S. Manufacturing Investment in Asia, 
by Size of Firm, 1988-1990 
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Size of the U.S. Parent Company 
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Same as Table A.l. 
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